In recent years, Kurdish nationalism has been among the most frequently invoked yet perhaps the least clearly defined concepts in Kurdish politics. Yet many of those who use the term spend more effort explaining what it is not than what it is. It is described, at various points, as “primitive,” “reactionary,” “emotional,” or “populist.” In this way, Kurdish nationalism stops being a political concept and turns instead into an accusation.
More often than not, it is read through the lens of Turkish, Arab or Persian nationalisms. Some see it merely as a reaction to denial; others define it solely as a state-building project. Yet none of these approaches manages to fully explain what Kurdish nationalism actually is.
The fundamental mistake here, in my view, is the constant attempt to define Kurdish nationalism through external conditions: denial, assimilation, oppression, lack of status, statelessness, and so on. All of these, of course, played important roles in the development of Kurdish political consciousness. But none of them, on its own, is the source of Kurdish nationalism.
For the Kurds did not become Kurds because they were denied, left stateless, or oppressed. The national existence of the Kurds rests on shared historical experiences, a shared memory, cultural continuity and a sense of collective belonging. To explain Kurdishness solely through the oppressions that have been visited upon it is therefore to confuse cause with consequence.
For a nation’s recognition of itself as a nation cannot be explained by the treatment it endures alone. National consciousness is nourished not only by oppression, but also by shared memory, shared belonging, shared historical experience and a shared sense of the future.
Defining Kurdish nationalism merely as a reaction to denial therefore remains insufficient. If nationalism were only reaction, then once denial disappeared, nationalism would disappear with it. But no national consciousness anywhere in the world functions in this way. The French today do not exist by way of opposition to the Germans, nor the Japanese to the Chinese, nor the Norwegians to the Swedes. And yet their national consciousness continues to live on.
The existence of a nation, then, does not depend on the existence of its adversaries.
Precisely for this reason, Kurdish nationalism cannot be defined purely through opposition. Such a definition would strip the Kurds of their status as a historical and political subject and reduce them to a community that merely reacts to outside forces. Yet what keeps a nation alive is not only its protests, but its continued capacity to see itself as a shared community.
Most importantly, one point needs to be made clear: nation and state are not the same thing.
The presence or absence of a state does not, on its own, explain the existence of a nation. People form a nation because they feel they belong to a particular community. A nation is a nation not merely because of the oppressions it has suffered, but because it continues to see itself as a community gathered around a shared history, a shared memory and a shared sense of belonging.
National consciousness therefore cannot be explained as the mere product of political conditions or historical oppression. On the contrary, it rests on a sense of collective belonging that outlasts those very conditions.
At this point, it is striking that Kurdish nationalism is so often interpreted through the lens of anti-colonial literature. The framework Frantz Fanon developed in particular for colonised peoples has become one of the most frequently cited references in debates on the Kurdish question.
Fanon’s contribution is, without question, important. It still holds its value, particularly for explaining how, in colonised societies, national consciousness becomes a force of political mobilisation. But Fanon’s framework helps us understand not why national consciousness emerges, but how it grows stronger under particular historical conditions. To explain Kurdish nationalism solely as a reaction to colonialism, denial or oppression, however, strikes me as deeply insufficient.
Such an approach searches for the source of national consciousness largely in the oppressions endured. Yet the collective existence of the Kurds rests on a reality older and deeper than those oppressions. Denial, assimilation and lack of status may have strengthened Kurdish national consciousness. But they did not bring it into being.
Moreover, if you define a nation’s national consciousness solely through the conditions it endures, then your definition collapses the moment those conditions disappear. In other words, if you define Kurdish nationalism purely through denial, then Kurdish nationalism would have to end the day denial ends.
Yet what makes a nation a nation is not what happens to it, but how it sees itself.
Defining Kurdish nationalism merely as a reaction, a defensive reflex or “the nationalism of an oppressed nation” therefore remains incomplete.
Kurdish nationalism is, above all, the consciousness Kurds carry of sustaining their collective existence, of remaining a political subject and of having a say over their own future. Denial, oppression and statuslessness may render that consciousness visible, may strengthen it or sharpen it. But they are not what bring it into being.
Another mistake, I think, is to treat Kurdish nationalism as if it were a monolithic ideology. Yet no nationalism, throughout history, has ever been monolithic.
Within what we today call Kurdish nationalism, one finds independentists, federalists, confederalists, liberals, conservatives, socialists, secularists, religious figures and right-wing voices all at once. And despite all these differences, the shared belonging to the Kurdish national question is not erased. On the contrary, this shows that Kurdish nationalism ought to be considered not as an ideology but as a far broader political family, or as a national political space in its own right.
Kurdish nationalism therefore cannot be reduced to an organisation, a party or a particular ideological line. It is neither mere loyalty to an organisation nor a form of allegiance shaped around a particular leader.
What lies at its centre is the continuation of the collective existence of the Kurds, their recognition as a political subject and their ability to have a say over their own future.
For this reason, Kurdish nationalism must be read not as an ideology of supremacy, but as the will of a nation to preserve its own existence, to reproduce itself and to determine its own future.